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ABSTRACT 
 
WAR, PEACE, AND TRANSPORTATION:  Using Computational Modeling to Explore 
the Effect of Transportation Technology on War 
(Under the direction of Thomas Oatley) 
 
Studies investigating the effect of interdependence on conflict have produced 
contradictory empirical findings.  Studies using datasets from the mid-19th century onward 
have found that increasing levels of trade between nations increase the likelihood of peace.  
Studies incorporating a longer time-frame have suggested the opposite.  I theorize that the 
effect of interdependence on war is a result of the level of interconnectedness in a system of 
trading countries.   I test the theory using a computational model which places countries in a 
randomly configured system.  As time passes, transportation technology increases and the 
effect of various levels of interdependence on war is observed.  The patterns of warfare 
which emerge from the computational model suggest that transportation technology had a 
variable effect in determining if countries go to war. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“These more dynamic models of how international trade and domestic 
politics interact are an important area of research.  They may tell us a good 
deal about what the rush to free trade, if sustained, may mean for the future.  
Will the global liberalization process bring increasing pressures for more 
openness and for democracy?  Or will it undermine itself and breed demands 
for closure and a backlash against governments and the international 
institutions that support openness?  Will openness produce a peaceful 
international system or one prone to increasing political conflict? The 
answers to these questions will in turn tell us much about the future direction 
of trade policy globally.”  (Milner, 1999) 
 
Does economic interdependence affect conflict between nations?  Existing research 
on interdependence and conflict offers an incomplete set of theories and conflicting 
evidence.  Liberal scholars argue that Kant’s initial intuition is correct: increased 
interdependence lessens the likelihood of conflict.  (Kant & Smith, 1903)  Mansfield and 
Pollins (Mansfield & Pollins, 2003) outline three reasons for this effect: that trade is a 
substitute for gains otherwise accrued through war, (Rosecrance, 1986) that trade creates 
better communication between dyads of trading partners resulting in greater ability to 
negotiate peace (Stein, 1993), and that trade creates interest groups who lobby for peace so 
they can continue trading.   
Other scholars argue that engaging in trade creates dependence and therefore 
opportunities for conflict to arise.(Barbieri, 1996; Hirschman, 1945)  These authors argue 
that trade creates interdependence and that interdependence, by its very nature, creates a 
power dynamic that is recognized and used by nations.  Countries who are unequally 
dependent on each other are characterized as having “asymmetrical relationships.”  Because 
one country is much more dependent on the other, it has more to lose than its more 
2independent trading partner.  The less dependent partner, through the threat of cutting 
trade, can gain concessions from its weaker trading partner.  It is argued that this mechanism 
of manipulation is why we should be skeptical of a peaceful future brought about through 
increasing levels of trade. 
In addition to these conflicting hypothesized causal pathways, studies have presented 
conflicting evidence about interdependence and war.(McMillian, 1997) When data from the 
later part of the 19th century onwards is used, trade is statistically linked to a greater 
likelihood of peace.(Domke, 1988; Gasiorowski & Polachek, 1982; Mansfield, 1994; Oneal, 
Oneal, Maoz, & Russett, 1996; Oneal & Russett, 1997; Oneal & Russett, 1999a; Oneal & 
Russett, 1999b; Polacheck, 1980)  Several scholars have focused on the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries and concluded that increased interdependence creates conflict.(Holsti, 
1991; Levy & Ali, 1998; Levy, 1999)  Still other authors find that when time is controlled for, 
then the effect of interdependence on peace is no longer significant. (Beck, Katz, & Tucker, 
1998)   
I theorize that understanding the role of transportation technology in the 
international system can help explain these disparate findings.  Other international relations 
scholars have theorized that transportation technology is a key component of understanding 
international change.1 Robert Gilpin (Gilpin, 1981) and Lars-Erik Cederman(L. Cederman, 
2003) view technological change as affecting the reach of nations and therefore their ability 
to make war against their peers.  However, neither explores the connection between trade, 
transportation technology and warfare.  Do different levels of transportation technology 
impact the probability of nations going to war?   
 
1 Scholars from other subfields have also studied the effects of changing transportation technology on political 
phenomena.  (Hart & Munger, 1989) 
3Expectations and Conflict 
Nations, and more particularly their selectorates, have expectations of welfare.2
When these expectations are not met, leaders must find a new source of goods with which to 
satisfy the selectorate.  If new trading partners can be found, welfare levels can be 
maintained without resorting to war.  If they cannot, then war becomes an option.  I posit 
that governments decide to fight wars because they face a guns-butter tradeoff (Viner, 1948) 
which is inherently contingent on stable international trade relationships. Chourci and North 
describe a dynamic similar to this one in their discussion of "lateral pressure.” (Choucri & 
North, 1975)   Although Choucri and North argue that lateral pressure results from internal 
growth and an increasing demand for resources, the point is the same: changes which reduce 
per capita domestic consumption put pressure on governments to take international action.  
I suggest that lateral pressure can be caused by changes in trade configurations brought on 
by technological change.  Unless replacements can be found, if a country loses trade partners 
when trade configurations change then per capita domestic consumption will decrease and 
domestic welfare losses will occur.  When this pressure reaches a given threshold it can cause 
decision-makers in a country to displace the welfare losses either through taking from other 
countries through war or by displacing consumption of specific groups inside their own 
country.   Exploring how consumption is redistributed internally would be an interesting 
endeavor, but is outside of the scope of this project.   
 
Trade, Guns and Butter 
Every country has a finite number of resources available to consume.  In the classical 
“guns-butter” tradeoff, countries must decide whether they will spend their resources on 
 
2 De Mesquita et al develop this idea in Chapter 7 of The Logic of Political Survival. (Bueno de Mesquita, 2003) 
4domestic consumption or on building a military.  Ideally, countries would spend at the x-
intercept in the figure below, spending all of their resources on butter.  But as the threat of 
war is ever present in the international system, countries also spend a portion of their 
resources to maintain a national military.   
 Under autarky a country’s spending on either guns or butter is constrained by how 
many resources it has available domestically.  When countries begin to trade, they begin to 
receive gains from trade. (Krugman & Obstfeld, 2003; Oatley, 2006)  These gains shift the 
production possibility frontier outward. Therefore, a country may now spend more on guns, 
butter or both. 
Figure One: Guns, Butter and Trade 
Once countries enter and begin to benefit from the international trade system their 
budget constraint is, in part, a function of trade.  Realists argue that being dependent upon 
foreign trade makes countries susceptible to manipulation by their trading partners.  
Countries also become vulnerable when trading partners disappear. A country may lose a 
5trading partner due to a shift of demand from their goods to other countries’ goods; one 
country’s decision to trade with another partner; or if a trading partner has been destroyed 
through conflict.  When a partner in trade disappears, domestic consumption necessarily falls 
unless a replacement partner can be found. 
 
Advances in Transportation Technology 
In order to understand exactly how changes in transportation technology affects the 
probability of warfare occurring in a system, it is important to understand how 
transportation technology has evolved overtime.  Instead of gradually and continuously 
improving, the world has become more interconnected in fits and starts. (Hugill, 1993)  
From the 1500s, transportation technology has increased in a stepwise fashion; a new 
technology is introduced and then a period of time passes before another increase in 
technology appears.  While levels of trade have fluctuated over time, the technologies 
underlying these changes have not regressed.  The Pandora's Boxes of the sailing ship, the 
airplane, and containerized cargo ship have irrevocably increased the physical accessibility of 
nations to each other, increasing the possibilities for both commerce and warfare. As 
transportation technology has increased the world has become more 
interconnected.3(Frieden, 2006) 
When transportation technology increases, the number of partners each country can 
trade with increases.  If they can find a more desirable partner after an increase in 
transportation technology, they will leave current trading relationships and enter into new 
trading relationships.  If a country loses a trading relationship, then it must either find a new 
 
3 It is likely that this process of increasing trade is not yet finished.  The Internet can usefully be thought of as 
the ability to transport labor instead of goods.  Labor in the information technology sector is currently being 
transported very quickly indeed! 
6partner or consume less than it did before the technological change occurred.  When a new 
trading partner is found, the consumption loss, which would have occurred from a cessation 
of trade, is prevented.  Finding new trading partners enables countries that have lost trade 
partners to continue trading and consuming.4
When trading partners shift, economic winners and losers are produced, not through 
explicit manipulation as the Realist would argue, but through the trading constituencies 
seeking their own best interests.  This shift causes a decrease in consumption for those 
countries that have had trade shift away from them.  Their production possibility frontier 
changes accordingly and the frontier shrinks back to pre-trade levels. (Figure One) Countries 
suffer as their gains from trade disappear (and rather suddenly).  
This is a different conception of the question of “why war?” than either the liberals 
or the realists would present.  Having a different answer to “why war?” allows us to offer a 
unique explanation to the adjunct question of “how does interdependence affect war?”   The 
outcomes of shifts in trading relationships are not constant over time.  Shifts in trading 
relationships interact with the relative number of trading partners to create broad patterns of 
war in the international system.    The model presented below tests the theory that early in 
the development of a trading system, shifts in trade between nations results in high levels of 
warfare.  This is due to the absence of alternate trading partners who can absorb the 
economic blow of the abandonment of trade relations.   Later, when the trading system 
becomes more integrated, the shock of losing trading partners is less likely to result in 
warfare.  A computational model founded on the micro-motivation of maintaining current 
 
4 One of the basic assumptions underlying this pattern is that the system contains independent political units 
which do not have the ability to redistribute gain between them.  When shifts in trade occur and both the costs 
and benefits fall under the same political structure then loosing constituents may lobby that political structure 
and cushion their losses.  However, when the gains and losses are distributed out of the context of one, unified 
nation political structure then adjustment mechanisms left to losers are limited to either war or decreased 
consumption levels for some part of the domestic population.   The issue of the level and coverage of the 
political units in which these losses occur is therefore a central one.   
7consumption levels, either through trade or through war, can be used to examine whether or 
not transportation technology has an effect on the probability of countries instigating wars.   
If the number and makeup of trading partners increases over time, we can explain 
the changing frequency of warfare by constructing a dynamic theory of the effects of trade 
over time.  When the computational model described in the following section is run, the 
results of these shifts in trade are dynamic across time.  When the number of trading 
partners is relatively small then these shifts in trading relationships produce frequent wars, 
but as time goes by the likelihood that a shift in trade results in war is reduced.  As countries 
have more available trading partners the negative effects of the shift in trade from one 
partner to another are reduced.  The market appears to be providing the security that a 
government would be providing to economic losers in a domestic setting.  Without the 
presence of a political organization who is able to ameliorate the effects, the model indicates 
that the larger the number of trading partners the more likely peace is.   
Other theories exploring the interplay of trade and conflict do not incorporate the 
idea that trading partners shift over time and that this shift can cause losses that societies are 
willing to go to war to recoup.  Increases in transportation technology can enable a country 
to leave a current trading partner for a more desirable one.  The country that loses a trading 
partner can either consume less, find a new partner, or go to war.   The likelihood of finding 
a replacement trading partner is also a function of transportation technology, because 
increases in transportation technology also increase the number of partners available for 
trade.   
Therefore, it is possible that increases in transportation technology can be both the 
cause and cure of war.  Increases in transportation technology cause wars when countries 
lose trade partners that they cannot replace.  However, with each increase in transportation 
8technology, the chances of finding a replacement partner increase.  The question is how to 
investigate this hypothesis. 
 
The Merits of Computational Modeling 
While it is possible to explore this theory using a time-series analysis, an alternate 
method of exploration is the use of computational modeling.  Computational modeling as a 
method of inquiry can be quite different than that of most formal social science.   Agent-
based modeling provides international relations researchers with a useful and unique tool 
with which to investigate theories.   
Much of international relations research seeks to find evidence in support of theory 
by using historical data.  This limits the field’s ability to draw conclusions when there is only 
one set of data from the last 100 years in which to test systemic theories.  This places 
international relations scholars in a methodological pickle.  Increasing the number of 
observations by decreasing the size of the time period can somewhat ameliorate the problem 
by providing more data points. Case studies provide another means for the international 
relations scholar to test theories, but are limited in its ability to draw broad conclusions.  
Agent-based modeling provides one way around the n=1 problem of modern systemic 
history.    
Advocates of agent-based modeling argue that the primary strength of this approach 
is the differing methodological perspective which it brings to the social sciences and to 
political science particularly. (L. E. Cederman, 2005; De Marchi, 2005; Kollman, Miller, & 
Page, 2003; Taber & Timpone, 1996)  This differing perspective incorporates the idea that 
process is an important matter of study.  Kollman, Miller, and Page write, “For those 
systems that attain equilibria and have been analyzed mathematically, computational models 
9can trace the paths to equilibria.  Yet the great strength of computational models is their 
ability to uncover dynamic patterns.” (pg. 8)   
Cederman explicitly attempts to set out an epistemological and ontological 
underpinning for the use of computational modeling in the social sciences by connecting 
inherently dynamic agent-based models with the philosophy of Georg Simmel and his focus 
on process in investigating social science phenomena. (L. E. Cederman, 2005) Taber and 
Timpone also agree that computational modeling is process focused and view this as the 
major strength of the approach.  (Taber & Timpone, 1996)  Agent-based modeling has a 
methodological advantage in that time is hard-wired into its very nature as an investigative 
tool.  
Chapter 2: Introduction to the Model 
 
Computational modeling was first applied to the field of international relations in the 
1970s and 1980s. (Bremer & Mihalka, 1977; Stoll, 1987) Most recently, and most 
prominently, Lars-Erik Cederman and his coauthors have produced a series of agent-based 
models with a distinctive set of characteristics.  First, their models attempt to model war in 
the international system.  They have produced models with a number of different variations 
on this theme including emergent borders(L. Cederman, 1997) and the inclusion of 
democratic regimes(L. Cederman, 2001; L. Cederman, 2002). Both models place the actors 
in an environment conceptualized from a Realist framework.  Second, Cederman, et al’s 
models rely on a grid system as the fundamental analogy for conceptualizing the 
international system.  In a grid system, countries can inhabit multiple cells in the grid but are 
only allowed to interact with those countries to which they are adjacent.  Since Cederman 
published Emergent Actors in World Politics in 1997 his models have become increasingly 
complex but have remained rooted in the grid system.  (L. Cederman, 1997)  Other agent-
based modelers have also employed the grid system in order to model various political 
phenomena. (Bhavnani, 2003; J. M. Epstein, Axtell, & 2050 Project, 1996; Lustick, 2000; 
Lustick, Miodownik, & Eidelson, 2004)  The final basic assumption of Cederman's family of 
models is that war is a random, probabilistic event that, once triggered, results in nations 
fighting until one destroys the other. 
By incorporating this basic set of characteristics, Cederman and his colleagues 
have provided fruitful research about how wars spread and the properties of different 
international systems.  Their models leave room for further investigation as they have 
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focused their models exclusively on the security side of the field and ignored the possible 
interactions with the field of international political economy.  Only one article, to my 
knowledge, has attempted to model trade and war together.  Bearce and Fisher investigate 
the relationship of war, trade and polarity.(Bearce & Fisher, 2002)  While they embrace the 
importance of geographical representation as other models have, they challenge the 
assumptions of previous models by choosing to model war as an endogenous process.  
Bearce and Fisher create a model in which changing transportation technology influences 
trade and war.  Bearce and Fisher complicate their model by including the possibility for 
incomplete information and bargaining in an attempt to implement the ideas of 
Fearon(Fearon, 1995) and Morrow(Morrow, 1989).   
Like Bearce and Fisher, the model presented here challenges several of Cederman’s 
assumptions, but does so without unduly complicating the model with game theoretic 
concepts. I challenge Cederman’s models because they neglect trade as a part of the 
international system, do not have an endogenous reason for why war occurs, and do not 
represent the international system as a network, but as a grid.  As Waltz correctly argues, 
there is much to be said for creating parsimonious models.(Waltz, 1979)  Therefore, what is 
to be gained from challenging the construction of Cederman's models and creating a less 
parsimonious model of the world?  First, while many international issues are best 
conceptualized as security problems, trade certainly plays a role in international 
politics.(Keohane & Nye, 2001)  Fully half the field of international relations is neglected 
when trade considerations are not accounted for.  Second, trade and war may be interrelated 
in important ways as hypothesized earlier.  
Once trade is added as a dynamic in the model, it is necessary to use a 
conceptualization of the world which allows every country to interact with every other 
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country. Using a grid system captures the idea that some of the world functions in two-
dimensional space. Rather than conceptualizing the world as a grid, this model 
conceptualizes the world as a network. In this network each country is a given distance from 
every other country and is able to fully interact with a country when transportation 
technology allows them to be connected.  In the language of formal mathematics, networks 
consist of nodes and edges which connect one node to another.  In this model, nodes are 
used to represent countries and edges are created between each and every country in the set 
of 200 countries.  In order to model distance between any two countries, each edge 
connecting them is assigned a random value between zero and one.  By connecting the 
nodes in this fashion the idea of two-dimensional space is left behind.  The distance between 
any three countries is not a product of a geometric relationship.  The distance between 
country one and country two and country two and country three does not condition in any 
way the distance between country one and country three.  This conceptualization can seem 
an awkward bending of spatial reality but it captures the reality of the world that trade 
volumes are not always a function of adjacent borders.  The advantage of using this network 
framework is that, unlike a grid, it captures the reality that at high levels of transportation 
technology every country is equally connected every other country.   
It is worth noting that this model is also a systems model.  For example, when a 
country looses a trading partner and is unable to find another partner, it can make war with 
any country that it is close enough to trade with not just the lost partner.  That is, changes in 
the relationship between two trading partners can have an effect on third parties. In this 
respect the model captures the systemic effects of shifts in trade.5
5 Other scholars have studied systems and system models (Jervis, 1997; Penubarti & Ward, 2000; Polachek, 
Robst, & Chang, 1999; Pollins & Kirkpatrick, 1987).  
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To investigate the systemic effects of shifts in trade, I create a model that meets 
Epstein’s five criteria for generative social science. (J. M. Epstein, 1999)  In order to qualify 
as generative social science, a model must have the following. First, the units involved must 
be heterogeneous.  Second, they must be autonomous.  Third, they must engage in an 
explicit space.  Fourth, their interactions must be local.  Fifth, they must be boundedly 
rational.  If each of these conditions holds then the generative social scientist can answer the 
generativist's question which is "how could the decentralized local interactions of 
heterogeneous autonomous agents generate the given regularity?"  In this case, the given 
regularity is the relationship between interdependence and war. 
The model presented here falls squarely within this framework.  The model begins 
with 200 agents engaging each other under the same set of rules.  The agents differ from 
each other only in that they are randomly endowed with different abilities to produce two 
goods at the beginning of each simulation.  Each agent makes autonomous decisions each 
round during the simulation based on the amount of domestic consumption, or “butter,” 
consumed each round.  The amount of butter consumed is defined as the total GDP of a 
country minus the amount spent on their military; the classic guns versus butter tradeoff.  
(Viner, 1948)  All agents are boundedly rational and make decisions about whether or not to 
engage in war or trade based on relatively simple decision rules.   
This paper uses a computational model dubbed IPE-Model (so named for its 
contrast to previous models) to explore if patterns of warfare can be explained by increases 
in transportation technology. IPE-Model is a Java program implemented using the 
programming package RepastJ.6 For the purposes of the discussion here, IPE-Model can be 
seen as a master program which orchestrates a fixed number of other programs which 
 
6 For details, history, and current Repast developments see http://repast.sourceforge.net/
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represent countries. IPE-Model then coordinates each of the units, giving each the chance to 
make individual decisions about trading and making war upon other countries.  IPE-Model 
records key information about each unit in each period in a database.  It also records 
statistics about the system as a whole at each period.    
 
The Logic of IPE-Model 
The main program, IPE-Model, is structured as follows. At the beginning of each 
run IPE-Model creates a world of 200 units which abstractly represent countries. Each unit 
has the exact same logical structure and therefore each unit responds to the same scenario in 
exactly the same fashion.  
At the beginning of each simulation each unit is endowed with a randomly 
determined amount of two complimentary goods, A and B. Each unit is given a random 
distance between zero and one from every other unit. These distances are distributed using a 
random number generator (0,1) with a uniform distribution.  
In each round a series of actions are executed by every unit in the system.7 IPE-
Model asks all 200 countries in sequence to perform each action before moving to the next 
action. For the first action, assess, each unit is asked to conduct the same series of 
calculations.  After every unit in the system has executed this action then the next action is 
called.  After every unit has preformed each and every action then an action called resetRound 
is executed which ends the round. When resetRound is executed, information is gathered, 
displayed graphically, and written to a database for analysis.  
During a run the only value of a unit variable which is exogenously changed by IPE-
Model is the range of vision which each unit has. This variable, internally referred to as 
 
7 In object oriented parlance, an action is a method which is called on each unit object. 
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technology, represents the transportation technology available to countries in the system at 
each time period.  At the beginning of a run each unit can see only other units that are 
within its original range of vision, .05 out of a possible 1.0. Since distribution of how far 
away every unit is from every other unit is set in a random and uniform fashion the number 
of units visible to any one unit at the beginning of a run with 200 units is probabilistically 
eight. Every fifty rounds, the range of visibility is increased by an increment of .05. This 
results in an increasing number of potential trading and fighting partners until round 950 
when every unit can interact with every other unit. This increase in vision represents 
technological change. Each run of the simulation consists of 1,000 rounds. 
 
The Structure of a Round 
During each round, every unit in the model is asked to do each of the following 
actions in the following order. Each action is executed for each unit before moving onto the 
next one.  Table Two, presented at the end of this section, summarizes what happens to a 
country in each round.  These actions are described in detail below.  
 
Assess 
At the beginning of each round it is important that each unit know two things about 
itself: (1) how much excess of either good A or good B it has to trade and (2) what units it is 
able to interact with this round. The method assess is called to ask each unit to calculate these 
two quantities.  
The first part of assess requires each unit to calculate the amount of good A and good 
B it is producing this round. In the opening round the amount of both A and B produced is 
randomly set between 1 and 50. After the opening round, the amount of A and B produced 
16
each round is a function of the amount of A and B produced during the previous round. A 
and B are defined to be complimentary goods. The total amount that each unit is able to 
consume is whichever good, A or B, the unit has the least of. Each unit places one half of 
the extra unconsumed amount in a “tradable” variable and keeps the other half to use when 
the complimentary good is traded for. For example, if Unit1 has one A and 11 Bs (1,11) it 
consumes 1 AB pair. It then takes the remaining 10 Bs, keeps half (five), and puts the other 
half (five) on the market in hopes of trading them for five A’s. These five Bs are stored in a 
variable called “tradable.”  
Table One: Unit1 in Round One 
Round One  Unit1  
Amount Produced (A,B) 1,11  
Amount Consumed without Trade 1
Amount Available to Trade 5 Bs 
Amount Reserved for Consumption 
of Newly Obtained A Goods 5 Bs  
The second action taken by each unit in assess is to systematically look at all of the 
other units in the system and check to see if they are available to trade with or make war 
against this round. If the distance from Unit1 to Unit2 is less than the maximum distance 
that the units can see given the level of transportation technology in that round, then they 
are able to both trade and make war with each other as their decision trees dictate. Unit1 and 
Unit2 are “visible” to each other. If the distance between them is greater than the maximum 
distance then they are not visible to each other and they will not interact this round. 
 
offerTrade 
When the method offerTrade is called, each unit iterates through the list of units 
visible to itself and offers them trades.  When assess was executed, each unit calculated the 
17
amount of excess A or B it had to offer and stored that amount in a variable called 
“tradable.” Each unit takes this excess and offers it to the first unit on its list. If the other 
unit has an excess of the opposite good, a trade is negotiated and the amount of A and B 
consumed by both units increase.8 Once a trade is executed, each unit determines if it has 
more to trade. If it does, the unit continues offering trades to the other visible units in the 
order which they appear on its list.  Each unit’s list has a unique starting point.  Trades are 
offered until the unit either runs out of goods to trade or partners to ask.   
 
setDefense 
In setDefense, each unit compares its own defenses to that of the other units that are 
visible to it. The first unit called in the first round (Unit1) looks at its first visible neighbor 
(Unit2) and asks it for its army size. In the first round Unit2 does not yet have an army. In 
the opening round, Unit2 decides to build an army and determines the size of that army by 
multiplying the amount it consumed after trading by a ratio (.2) dubbed 
“initialDefenseRatio.” Unit2 then tells Unit1 the size of the army it has created.  
When Unit1 receives this information, it then makes a series of decisions to decide 
what size army it should have. Each unit will spend up to one half of its total consumption 
on building an army. If the army of Unit2 is greater than one-half of Unit1’s post-trade 
consumption then Unit1 will build an army that is one half of its own consumption. If the 
army of Unit2 is smaller than one half of Unit1’s consumption, then Unit1 sets its army to 
the size of Unit2’s.  
 
8 The unit receiving the offer uses the method acceptOffer to if the offer should be accepted and how much of 
the offer it will make use of.   This method is called by the unit offering the trade, not by IPE-Model.  The 
method (or action) is executed by the unit who receives the offer.   
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Unit1 then goes on to examine each of the other units that are visible to it. When it 
encounters an army that is larger than its current army, it follows the same decision process 
detailed above. When this process is finished it subtracts the size of the army it has created 
this round from the amount it consumed after it finished trading. The remainder is how 
much “butter” it has been able to consume this round.   
Domestic Consumption = Butter + Guns  
This formula conceptualizes the inherent tradeoff countries must make in choosing between 
domestic consumption and military spending.(Viner, 1948)  Table Two details the set of 
decisions described above.   
 
Table Two: Decision Structure for Determining Defense Spending  
(the method setDefense) 
Overview: C1 iterates through InteractionListC1. The size of InteractionListC1 is a 
function of transportation technology and contains a list of countries (C2, C3, . . . 
CN), which are a subset of all countries in the model.  
Beginning of Method:
C1 compares its military (M1) to the military  
of the first country in its list of visible countries (M2). 
Decision Node One:
Is M1>M2?
Yes  No  
C1 examines its budget.  
P
P
P
P
C1 does nothing. 
Decision Node Two: 
 Can C1 spend enough to create a military as big as M2 without spending 
more than 1/2 of its GDP? 
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Yes  No  
P
C1 spends enough to set 
M1 = M2  
C1 spends 1/2 half of its GDP on 
the military.  
If there are more countries in InteractionListC1 then setDefense is executed again starting at 
Step One. This time the next country in InteractionListC1 is used. If there are no more 
countries in the list then C1 has finished setting its defense for this round.  
makeWar 
After each unit has produced what it can, traded for as much additional wealth as it 
can, and spent a percentage of its total wealth in preparing its defenses then it does a self-
check.  This check is to see whether or not it has consumed what it has on average for the 
last five time periods plus 3% of that average.9 If it has met this condition then the unit 
(again, for clarity Unit1) will not instigate any wars. If Unit1 consumed less than that 
amount, it will then run through a number of decisions about whether or not to go to war to 
see if it can to win, through war, the ability to consume what it could not through trade.    
In deciding whether or not to go to war, Unit1 solicits the size of each visible unit’s 
army.  It then selects the weakest unit (again Unit2 for purposes of clarity) and checks two 
conditions.  First, Unit1 checks to see if its army is 10% stronger than the army of Unit2.  
Second, it checks to see if the spoils to be collected from Unit2 (20% of Unit2’s butter) are 
more than the cost of going to war (10% of Unit1’s army).  If both these conditions hold, 
then Unit1 will instigate war. If either condition is false, then Unit1 will look to the next 
visible unit and ask the same questions.  
 
9 During the first five time periods, this method is not executed. 
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Figure Two: The Decision Whether or Not to Initiate War 
If Unit1 decides to go to war against Unit2, then the following series of calculations 
take place. First, an “advantage” variable is calculated by dividing the size of Unit1’s army by 
the sum of Unit1’s army and Unit2’s army.   
advantage = (Unit 1’s ArmySize)/ (Unit 1’s ArmySize+ Unit 2’s ArmySize)  
Because Unit1 only attacks countries with smaller armies “advantage” will always be greater 
than .5.   Then a random number between zero and one is generated with a uniform 
distribution. The attacking unit wins if the random number generated is less than the 
“advantage” variable. For example, if the attacker’s army is twice the size of the attacked, 
then the attacker has a two in three chance of wining.  
The winner then examines the “spoils” variable of both itself and its opponent.  The 
size of the spoils variable is 20% of each units’ wealth.  The winner collects the smaller of 
the two spoils variables and adds that value to its own butter consumption. The loser 
internalizes this lost by subtracting the “spoils” value from its butter consumption. As 
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eluded to earlier, both sides suffer a reduction in the size of their armies.  The losing unit’s 
army is reduced by 20% and the winning unit’s army is reduced by 10%.  
The unit whose turn it is then determines if it is now satisfied. If it is not, then it 
looks at the next visible unit and asks the same set of questions about whether or not to 
make war. When the unit is either satisfied or has exhausted its list of partners, it ceases to 
make war this round. In turn, the next unit decides whether or not to make war. When each 
unit has had its turn the next method is called.   
 
resetRound 
At this point in any given round, each unit is called upon to make internal 
calculations about the result of the round and store them for the master program, IPE-
Model, to retrieve. After resetRound is run, the final variables from the run are available and 
IPE-Model uses them in creating graphical and excel-based outputs.  
 
22
Table Three: Structure of a Round for Country C1 
Action (or 
method) Description  Variables Created  
In round one the amount of good A and the 
amount of good B are randomly set between 
1 and 50. In all later rounds C1 produces 3% 
more of both goods (A and B) than it did in 
the previous round. C1 then determines how 
much it would like to trade with its partners 
by pairing one unit of A with one unit of B 
and placing any excess in a variable called 
AmountTradableC1 for later use.  
AmountTradableC1  
assess 
C1 then creates a list of the countries it can 
interact with. The countries contained in this 
list are a function of the level of technology 
development of the system which is 
exogenously given and increases every 50 
rounds.  
InteractionListC1(technology); 
offerTrade 
While C1 has goods to offer it sequentially 
asks each partner in InteractionListC1 if it 
would like to trade. If CX would like to trade, 
C1 then reduces the amount it has to trade 
by the amount traded. When it has nothing 
less to trade then it stops looking for 
partners.  
 
acceptTrade 
C1 examines offers from other countries. If 
the offer is beneficial then C1 reduces 
AmountTradableC1 until 
AmountTradableC1 = 0. When this occurs 
C1 no longer trades.  
 
setDefense 
C1 examines every county in 
InteractionListC1. When another country 
has a larger army than C1, C1 builds its army 
to match the size of the opposing army. C1 
will spend up to 1/2 of its GDP to create its 
army. At a minimum, C1 will spend 20% of 
its GDP on its army.   
Military Size (M1)  
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assessAgain 
C1 subtracts how much it spent on its army 
to determine how much it can consume 
domestically. If that consumption is 3% less 
than the average of the previous five rounds, 
C1 is "dissatisfied."  
Dissatisfied  
makeWar  
If C1 is dissatisfied, C1 looks through 
InteractionListC1 for weaker units. If C1 is 
10% stronger than the other units (CX), C1 
will start a war. The winner of the war is a 
randomly determined with C1's chance of 
winning increasing the larger its military is 
compared to CX's military. The winner 
collects spoils from the loser and adds them 
to its consumption total. Both units lose a 
percentage of their armies during the 
conflict. The winner loses 10% and the loser 
20%.   
 
resetRound 
Dissatisfied, InteractionListC1, and 
AmountTradableC1 are set to zero. Military 
Size is reduced by 10 percent. If C1 lost a 
war this round its ability to produce both 
goods A and B is reduced by 20%.  
 
Chapter 3: General Patterns of Warfare 
This section presents the output of the system as a whole to provide a general 
picture of how the system behaves.  Given the assumptions and structure of the model, we 
expect war to initially be triggered by increases in trading technology.  Some countries will 
find more preferable trading arrangements with new partners and therefore leave former 
partners.  Figure One presents an example of the data output from a sample run of the 
model.  
In this run, the predicted systemic pattern of warfare is occurring as expected.  Wars 
occur after increases in transportation technology.  As time passes the system returns to 
equilibrium.   Increases in transportation technology early in the development of the system 
result in surges of war beginning at t = 51, 101, 151 . . . 350.  From t = 400 to t= 550 
subsequent improvements in transportation technology result in no wars.  At t= 551 a major 
war begins.  After t = 800 the system settles into a permanent peaceful equilibrium despite 
technological increases at t = 851, 900 and 951.  This run suggests that changes in 
transportation technology are less likely to result in periods of war later in the development 
of the system and that when they do they will involve more countries than they do earlier in 
the system’s development.   
 
25
Figure Three:
Sample Run (Run Number 37)
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Each run of the simulation is unique in the sense that the amount of good A and 
good B that each country produces is randomly determined at the beginning of the run and 
that the distance between each dyad is randomly set.  In order to draw conclusions about the 
behavior of the model, a sample needed to be produced and analyzed.  The simulation was 
run 50 times and these runs are analyzed below.  Figure Two presents the average number of 
countries who are engaged in warfare across the 1,000 time periods of the simulation.   
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Figure Four: Average Number of Countries at War (N=50)
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Again, wars occur after increases in transportation technology. Table 2 suggests that the 
effects of increasing transportation technology differ over time. The average number of 
countries at war in time period 951 is considerably lower than those peaks occurring before  
t = 500.  
Interestingly, when we further parse the results, we see that later in the system’s 
development the average number of wars is driven by large infrequent wars.  Increases in 
transportation technology early in the run, almost always result in war. Increases in 
transportation technology later in the run, rarely result in war, but when these wars occur, 
they involve a large number of countries.    
Figure Three presents the median number of wars across the sample for a given time 
period. Here we see clearly that trade has a different effect on war at different points in the 
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system’s development. Periods later in the system’s development are much less likely to have 
conflict.  
Figure Five: Median Number of Contries at War (N=50)
0
5
10
15
20
25
1 101 201 301 401 501 601 701 801 901
Time
N
u
m
be
r
o
fC
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
a
tW
a
r
The converse is that though the wars are less likely to occur they are more likely to 
involve a large number of countries and involve them for a longer period of time. Table 
Four presents the most wars and the fewest wars that ever occurred in any given time period 
over the course of 50 runs of the simulation.  
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Figure Six:
Minimum and Maximum Number of Countries at War (N=50)
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These results occur because, though war is infrequent, they involve a large number 
of countries in the post t = 500 stage. An example of this is given in Figure Five where a 
very large war is observed beginning at t = 701. This war is large, not simply because the 
number of countries involved at t = 701 is almost 50, but because the countries persist in 
their warfare for almost 100 periods. The total number of “country war years” for the period 
t=701 to t=801 is 2,432. This period of war is substantially “larger” than the period of war 
occurring from t = 201 to t = 301 which also had a maximum of 34 countries involved at its 
peak but contained only 1,127 “country war years.”   
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Figure Seven: Run Number 25
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Chapter 4: Causation of War in the System 
The observations above show the general patterns of total countries at war in the 
system.  I wish to investigate what predicts whether or not a country will start a war in any 
given period.  Countries initiate war when consumption falls relative to historical levels. But 
as we have seen, the pattern of warfare seems to vary across time.   The first step in an 
investigation is to see if this pattern can be statistically established.  Is transportation 
technology negatively related to instigating war?   
If transportation technology does have an effect on instigating wars, then the second 
question to answer is why does this relationship hold?  Countries always go to war because 
they are deprived of butter consumption.  What conditions make this deprivation more 
likely?  What other variables could account for whether or not they make war?  The 
empirical investigation below attempts to sort out these issues.    
In order to test if there is a relationship between transportation technology and 
instigating war, I recorded the dependent variable, making war, and four independent 
variables: technology and three control variables.  Each of these variables are recorded for 
each country in each time period. 
If the relationship of transportation technology to conflict is established, I propose 
two mechanisms to explain why the frequency of wars falls over time as transportation 
technology increases: 
Causal Mechanism 1: As each unit’s trade becomes distributed across a larger 
number of partners, the impact on consumption caused by the loss of any 
single trading partner is too small to trigger war.    
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Causal Mechanism 2: The farther each unit can see, the more likely it is that 
each unit can replace one lost trade partner with a new trade partner.    
 
I created two variables to test these two causal mechanisms.   First, if a concentration of 
trade variable was statistically linked to a decrease in the likelihood of a country to instigate 
wars, then there would be support for Causal Mechanism 1.  Second, if a variable which 
captured the number of untapped trading partners was linked to a decrease in the likelihood 
of a country to instigate wars, then there would be support for Causal Mechanism 2. That is, if 
being connected to a greater number of countries enables a country to find new trading 
partners instead of incurring a loss, then the total number of untapped partners should be 
correlated with decreases in war instigation.    
Table Four: Discerning between Causal Mechanisms    
Variable   Expected Relation to Instigating Wars   
Trade Concentration Index  
for Individual Countries    Positive Sign    
Number of Untapped Partners    Negative Sign   
The variables of interest are enumerated below. The reasoning behind their 
inclusion in the statistical analysis is provided in their description.  The direction of their 
influence on the dependent variable is also hypothesized.    
 
Dependent Variable   
The dependent variable, madeWar, is a binary variable.  It represents whether or not a 
country instigated a war in a particular year.  Although a country could theoretically instigate 
up to 199 wars, we are interested in what predicts their instigation of war, not how many 
wars they instigate.   
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Independent Variables10
Technology measures how far each unit sees; it ranges between .05 and 1.  Technology increases 
by .05 every 50 time periods over the course of 1,000 time periods. The expected effect is 
unclear.  It is possible that interacting with an increasing number of units will buffer trade 
shocks causing countries to make war less often.  It is also possible that interacting with 
increasing numbers of units exposes countries to a greater number of warring countries. By 
losing resources in a war, countries might then be forced to go to war the next time period. 
 The last possibility is that, by seeing more countries, the number of weak countries which a 
country would want to make war against increases.  
Concentration of Trade is calculated in the following manner.  First, the percentage of each 
unit’s wealth due to trade is calculated by subtracting the pre-trading period wealth by the 
post-trade wealth and dividing by the post-trade wealth.  If a country gets most of its wealth 
from trade, this number will trend towards a value of one.  If little of a country’s wealth 
comes from trade, then this variable will trend towards zero.  This percentage is then divided 
by the number of its trading partners.  The measure reflects each unit’s average dependence 
on its partners where higher values indicate a higher level of dependence on a smaller 
number of countries.  We expect this variable to take a positive sign. 
 
10 Another variable was included in an initial analysis: Largest Army Two Links Away. It is possible that countries 
go to war because they are forced to increase their defense spending as their neighborhood expands as a 
function of technological change.  In order to test for this causal effect each neighbor was queried about its 
largest neighbor.  The largest value of this list of the largest neighbor’s neighbors is then recorded.  If countries 
are going to war because they are forced to engage in more military spending due to encountering larger 
neighbors we expect this variable to take a positive sign.  It was not significant. 
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Potential Trade Partners is the difference between the number of countries with which each 
unit did trade and the total number of available trading partners.  This difference is the 
number of countries which each unit could turn to in response to the loss of trade from one 
existing trade partners.  We expect this variable to have a negative coefficient.   
Armies Lost is the natural logarithm of number of armies each unit lost in war in the previous 
round.  Units replace armies lost in round T-1 with spending in round T. Because army size 
is in part a function of the economic size of a country and the economy grows exponentially, 
it was necessary to log the value.  We expect this variable to take a negative sign. 
Pre-War Army Size is the natural logarithm of the size of each unit’s military force after the 
method setDefense is called and before makeWar is called. The larger a country’s army is, 
the more likely it is that it has a large military to be able to successfully initiate wars.  As army 
size is in part a function of the economic size of a country and the economy grows 
exponentially, it was necessary to log the raw value of this variable.  We predict this variable 
to take a positive sign in predicting war. 
Victim of War measures the number of times each unit has been attacked by other units in 
each round.  When a county is attacked it has, by definition, a less than 50% chance of 
winning.  If a country looses in war, 20% of its wealth will be taken from it.  It will then 
become dissatisfied and will look to make war that round if the method makeWar has not 
yet been called for that unit.  We expect this variable to take a positive sign.   
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Descriptive Statistics of the Variables  
Table Five presents the descriptive statistics of the variables listed above.  Armies 
Lost and Pre-War Army Size are presented after their transformation via the natural 
logarithm function. 
Table Five: Descriptive Statistics of 
Variables Across All Observations 
(9,990,000 observations per variable)
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Error 
Technology .05 1 0.525 0.288 
Armies Lost (LN) -3.724 29.059 0.101 1.048 
Victim of War 0 27 .058 .488 
Pre-War Army Size (LN) -3.411 31.782 13.584 9.424 
Concentration of Trade 0 .96 .242 0.224 
Unused Partners 0 199 102.540 57.493 
Results rounded to three decimal places. 
Statistical Methods   
In order to investigate which of the variables predicts madeWar, I recorded the 
values of the dependent and independent variables of each country during each time period 
for all 50 runs.  This resulted in 50 datasets with 199,800 rows and seven columns each.   
Each dataset was formatted in the fashion similar to that of a panel data set: each country 
(N=200) was recorded at each time period (t = 0 to t = 1,000).  The dependent variable is 
binary with madeWar = 1 indicating that a country initiated a war in a given time period and 
madeWar = 0 indicating that it did not.  As the dependent variable was binary, I employed 
the SAS technique GENMOD to fit a logistic model to data and control for errors resulting 
from repeatedly measuring the same countries.  This model was run on each of the 50 data 
sets in order to test which variables were significant in which runs.   
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Results  
 The first test I ran was to confirm that that increasing levels of transportation 
technology actually did have a significant and negative effect on the dependent variable 
madeWar.  In order to do this I employed the following model:  
madewar = madeWarUpon +  preWarArmySize +  Armies Lost +  technology 
The results of this model are displayed in Table Six.  Unsurprisingly, the independent 
variables Armies Lost, Victim of War, and Pre-War Army Size were all significant at the .01 
level in all 50 runs.  Surprisingly, the sign for Pre-War Army-Size was negative, that is, having 
a larger army makes you less likely to instigate a war.  
The other surprising result is that the effect of technology varied from run to run, 
with one run actually having technology be a strong predictor in the wrong direction.  This 
occurred in run 9.  An analysis of this run reveals an unusually low number of wars early in 
the simulation, high levels of warfare in the middle third, and a large war from t = 950 to t = 
1,000. 
Table Six: Number of 
Times Significant Out of 
50 Runs Sign 
Not 
Significant
Significant 
at the .1 
level 
Significant 
at the .05 
level 
Significant 
at the .01 
level Outlier*
Armies Lost + - - - 50 - 
Victim of War + - - - 50 - 
Pre-War Army Size - - - - 50 - 
Technology - 5 - 3 41 1* 
Model Run: madewar= madeWarUpon +  preWarArmySize +  Armies Lost +  technology;
* In run 9 technology is significant at the .01 level but with a positive sign.  An analysis of this run reveals an 
unusually low number of wars early in the simulation, high levels of warfare in the middle third, and a large war 
from t = 950 to t = 1,000 
These findings suggest that the level of transportation technology in the system has an effect 
on the likelihood of a country to instigate war in the system.   
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The descriptive statistics for the parameter estimates are displayed in Table Seven.  
The standard errors displayed in Table Seven are generated using the MIANALYZE 
procedure in SAS.  Originally developed by Rubin (Rubin, 1987) to impute missing data by 
combining data sets the MIANALYZE procedure produces standard errors by combining 
the standard errors of both the individual parameters and the differences between the 
parameter estimates themselves.11
Table Seven: Descriptive Parameter 
Estimates of Variables Across All 
Observations  
(50 observations per parameter) 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Error 
Technology -1.597 0.396* -0.502 0.426 
Armies Lost (LN) 0.654 1.120 0.902 0.113 
Victim of War 0.484 1.696 1.323 0.179 
Pre-War Army Size (LN) -0.613 -0.355 -0.455 0.057 
Results rounded to three decimal places. 
*This positive result occurs only once in the analysis of run 9.  All other estimates of this parameter were 
negative. 
The question of why increasing levels of technology result in less war was 
investigated by removing technology from the logistic regression and inserting Concentration of 
Trade and Unused Partners to test the two causal mechanisms. The following model was used 
and the results are displayed in Table Eight.  
madeWar = madeWarUpon +  preWarArmySize +  Armies Lost +  Concentration of Trade +   
Unused Partners 
In this regression the three control variables, Armies Lost, Victim of War, and Pre-War Army 
Size,  all maintained their signs and were significant at the .01 level in all 50 runs.  The results 
of the two independent variables were less uniform and are displayed in Table Eight.   
Unused Partners was significant in the correct direction in 92 percent of the runs and was 
 
11 J.L. Shafer (Schafer, 1997) provides a useful summary, pages 106-112. 
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highly significant in 84 percent of the runs.  Concentration of Trade preformed slightly less well.  
It was significant in the correct direction for 88 percent of the runs and highly significant in 
78 percent of the runs.   
Table Eight: 
Number of Times 
Significant Out of 
50 Runs Sign 
Not 
Significant
Significant 
at the.1 level
Significant 
at the .05 
level 
Significant 
at the .01 
level Outlier
Concentration of 
Trade - 5 1 4 39 1* 
Unused Partners - 2 0 4 42 2** 
Armies Lost + - - - 50 - 
Victim of War + - - - 50 - 
Pre-War Army Size - - - - 50 - 
Model Run:  
madeWar = madeWarUpon +  preWarArmySize +  Armies Lost +  Concentration of Trade +  Unused Partners 
* For run 3 Concentration of Trade was positive and significant at the .1 level.   
** For two runs Unused Partners took a positive value. Run 9 was significant at the .05 level and run 18 at 
.01 level. 
These results indicate that both measures are useful in predicting whether or not a country 
will instigate a war in a given time period, though Unused Partners is a better predictor across 
the sample of simulation runs.
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Table Nine: Descriptive Parameter 
Estimates of Variables Across All 
Observations  
(50 observations per parameter) 
Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Error 
Concentration of Trade -0.112* 1.433 0.498 0.353
Unused Partners -0.009 0.001** -0.003 0.002
Armies Lost (LN) 0.644 1.102 0.892 0.114
Victim of War 0.487 1.691 1.318 0.178
Pre-War Army Size (LN) -0.591 -0.332 -0.443 0.056
Results rounded to three decimal places. 
* The Concentration of Trade parameter took a negative sign for three runs: two insignificant and one 
significant at the .1 level. (Runs 23, 29 and 3 respectively). 
** For two runs Unused Partners took a positive value. Run 9 was significant at the .05 level and run 18 at 
.01 level 
Chapter 5: Conclusion 
 
The results of the previous section suggest that the level of transportation 
technology in a system can play an important effect on whether or not a country chooses to 
instigate war.  In some runs the effect of technology (or its component parts) is highly 
significant.  In other runs it has little effect.  In one run, Run 9, higher levels of 
transportation technology was a significant predictor of warfare.  The variations in these 
findings are consistent with the variable findings in the literature.  This model presents 
evidence that both the post-19th century analyses (finding trade is associated with peace) and 
those that incorporate a larger time frame (finding that trade produces conflict) are correct, 
though the finding suggest a degree of spurious causation in the former.   
This model provides support for several different streams of the political science 
literature.  The significance of the Concentration of Trade variable provides support for the 
conclusion that countries that are highly dependent on a few countries for their welfare are 
more likely to be engaged in wars.  (Barbieri, 1996)  
The significance and sign of the variable, Unused Partners, suggests that countries are 
less likely to make war in an interconnected system because they have more opportunities to 
mitigate welfare losses due to the presence of untapped trading relationships.  This runs 
counter to the pure Realist argument and questions the conclusions of those who take a dim 
view of the effect of trading relationships and peace. (Hirschman, 1945)  Perhaps it is not 
the trading relationships themselves, but the presence of alternative partners in the 
international system that makes war less prevalent as the world is more interconnected.  
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Appendix - Illustrative Example of Three Countries over Three Rounds 
This appendix provides an example of the mechanisms involved in the model using an 
example of two countries who engage in trade in rounds T and T+1.  In round T+2 a third 
country is introduced and the effect explained.   
 
Round T 
In Round T, Saudi Arabia and the US have the productive capacity to produce two 
things, food and oil (food, oil). SA has (1,11) the US (11,1) We assume these goods are 
compliments and that these two countries want to trade. They swap 5 oils for 5 foods then 
have the following SA (6,6) and the US (6,6). 
A country can spend its consumption on butter or guns. It sets its guns consumption 
based on what its neighbor does. As this is the first round, they would both build their 
armies to be .2 the size of their own economy. In this example the army size is .2*6 = 1.2. 
The amount left over is the butter it consumes as:  
GDP – Guns = Butter 
From Formula 1 we know that the butter is 4.8.  
Round T   SA  US  
Productive Capacity 1,11  11,1  
Amount Produced 1,11  11,1  
Amount Traded 5 5
Total Amount to be 
Consumed 6 6
On Military 1.2 1.2 
On Butter 4.8 4.8 
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Round T+1 
In Round T+1 each country’s productive capacity grows by .03.  So far so good. Now the 
question is what to do with the army size (.2*6.18 = 1.236). Applying Formula 1 again we see 
that the butter for each country is now 4.944.  
Round T+1  SA  US  
Productive Capacity 1.03,11.33  1.33,1.03  
Amount Produced 1.03,11.33  11.33,1.03  
Amount Traded 5.15 5.15 
Total Amount to be 
Consumed 6.18 6.18 
On Military 1.236 1.236 
On Butter 4.944 4.944 
Round T+2: 
In order to provide a picture of the dynamics produced by introducing new trading 
partners, this round complicates the story by introducing a third country to the trade group: 
Germany. Germany is randomly assigned the ability to produce five units of food and one 
unit of oil.  
At the beginning of Round T+2 every one grows again. Then, when SA looks to 
trade if first trades with Germany 2 oils for 2 foods. Now SA only has 3.3 oils to trade with 
the US, dramatically driving down the US’s overall consumption.  
When setDefense is called, SA sets its army .2*5.36 = 1.27. Germany and the US 
match this 1.27 and 1.27. The result of building a larger army and consuming less through 
trade is that in this round in the US consumes 2.09 units of butter compared to 4.9 from the 
previous round. This reduction is approximately a 57% reduction in welfare from the 
previous round. This magnitude of reduction trips the 5% reduction threshold for the US 
when the makeWar action is run. Because this threshold is tripped, the US examines its 
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chances of winning a war with both SA and Germany in the hopes of finding a weaker 
neighbor to capture resources from. Since the US is not 10% stronger than either neighbor it 
does not attempt to win a war and the round ends.  
Round T+2  SA Germany  US  
Productive Capacity  1.061,11.67  5, 1  11.67, 1.061 
Amount Produced  1.061,11.67  5, 1  11.67, 1.061 
Amount Traded  2 + 3.3 = 5.3  2 3.3 
Total Amount to be 
Consumed 6.36 3 3.36 
On Military 1.27 1.27 1.27 
On Butter 5.09 1.73 2.09 
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